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FORTY YEARS IN THE DESERT
Paul F. Campos*
The participants in this symposium have been asked to do directly what
constitutional theorists have been doing indirectly for more than a generation:
Rewrite a Warren Court opinion to make the putative basis for its result more
consonant with the craft values taught in contemporary American law schools.
We have, it is true, been given the option of explaining why the actual opinion
in Brown v. Board of Education' was "appropriate." Yet I venture to guess that
our hosts would be almost as appalled by assertions that Brown was correctly
reasoned as they would by any intimation that it was incorrectly decided.
Nevertheless, without wishing to abuse their generous hospitality, I propose that
we accept Brown for what it is,-and in doing so focus on some of the
fundamental premises of modem constitutional scholarship, and indeed
American legal theory.
If we understand it as an exercise in textual interpretation, modem
constitutional law is taken up almost wholly with the defense of the
indefensible.2 From Lochner v. New York to Roe v. Wade,4 from the appear-
ance of the incorporation doctrine to the disappearance of the Commerce
Clause,5 the United States Reports are filled with landmarks of hermeneutic
reasoning which require of their audience a willing suspension of disbelief.
Legal academia has, of course, been up to this task, and never more so than with
Brown. Seas of ink have been spilled to "save" Brown; furthermore, while
undertaking these rescue missions law professors cannot resist displaying their
interpretive talents through attempts to salvage other, even more problematic
examples of jurisprudential art.6 By now we all know that in the course of these
herculean endeavors the typical constitutional theorist will explain why the
meaning of the Constitution is more or less exactly coterminous with his or her
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. For elaboration, see Paul Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, 4 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 279
(1992); Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REv. 817 (1993); Paul Campos,
Three Mistakes About Interpretation, 92 MICH. L. REv. 388 (1993).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3.
6. For a good summation and critique of this interpretive project, see MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE,
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
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political commitments, whether these reflect those of a welfare state liberal, a
laissez faire libertarian, or a radical Marxist in Ivy League drag. The following
story, told by one of our best- legal scholars, should serve as a cautionary tale:
Grading the final examinations in my class on constitutional law last
semester, I realized that for my students there was no gap, no disjunction,
between the Constitution and their own political perspective. As a
committed legal realist, trained to discern, question, and clarify the political
purposes of the law, I had apparently succeeded only in making the law for
my students utterly transparent to their own political will. I took some
comfort in the fact that this influence would surely prove only temporary for
the vast majority of my students who would become practitioners. Practicing
lawyers learn quite quickly not to confuse their own political will with that
of the larger culture, from which law properly springs .... I also realized,
however, that there was no obvious mechanism to convey this message to
those few of my students fated to become academics. In fact all our
academic assumptions point in the opposite direction.7
Why do all our legal academic assumptions point in the opposite direction?
Here I think we confront in its purest form the pernicious influence of what
Ronald Dworkin recommends as the "internal perspective." He describes this
perspective in his major work, Law's Empire:
This book takes up the internal participant's point of view; it tries to grasp the
argumentative character of our legal practice by joining that practice and
struggling with the issues of soundness and truth participants face. We will
study formal legal argument from the judge's viewpoint... because judicial
argument about claims of law is useful paradigm for exploring the central,
propositional aspect of legal practice.8
As my colleague Pierre Schlag has argued, the professional identification the
legal academic typically makes with the persona of the appellate court judge has
been in many ways a disaster for American legal scholarship. 9 For example, it
should come as no surprise that in Law's Empire, "a useful paradigm for
exploring law" is soon transmogrified into a totalizing, quintessentially juridical
account of what "the law" requires. Dworkin's account relies on the fact that,
in our legal culture, the judicial vocation requires the ability to make supremely
7. Robert Post, Lani Guinier, Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal Scholarship, 11 CONST.
COMMENT. 185, 193 (1994).
8. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPmE 14 (1986).
9. See generally Pierre Schiag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1627 (1991); Pierre
Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 2053 (1993).
[Vol. 20
Symposium
confident declarations about the law. That it is integral to a legal scholar's
vocation is, or should be, a far more troubling proposition.' °
Let us consider that proposition from the perspective of this conference.
We have been asked to put ourselves in the place of the nine men who, forty
years ago, decided to declare that segregated schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." It is a commonplace that
Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion for the Court is in many ways
unsatisfactory. Indeed, that assumption is central to this symposium. The
opinion asserts that the legislative history of the Equal Protection Clause 2 is
inconclusive regarding the question of segregated schools.' 3 This is
disingenuous: At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, eight
northern states had segregated public schools, and five others simply banned
black children from public schools altogether. 14 As Raoul Berger has pointed
out, even the Senate galleries who listened to the debates concerning the
Fourteenth Amendment were segregated by race.' 5 Congress allowed the
District of Columbia's schools to remain segregated until the Supreme Court
declared this situation unconstitutional the same day it decided Brown.16 The
historical record is not really in doubt: Those who adopted the Equal Protection
Clause 7 never believed that it prohibited the segregation of public schools.
Another difficulty with the Court's argument is that it is purportedly based
on assumed psychologically-and by inference educationally-detrimental effects
of segregation on black children. This is even more implausible than the
Court's handling of the Fourteenth Amendment's historical meaning. The Court
soon demonstrated that it could not have believed its own argument by issuing
a series of per curiam decisions which declared unconstitutional the segregation
of public beaches, golf courses, parks, courtrooms, and other facilities.' 8
Brown's weak reasoning, and the incongruous claim that these results were
entailed by it, demanded explanation. Hence, law professors have been
rewriting the case ever since.
These alternative opinions tend to follow one of two patterns, which,
following Thomas Grey's coinage, I will call "interpretive" and
10. See Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, supra note 2, at 849-54.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Id.
13. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1954).
14. RICHARD KLUGAR, SIMPLE JUSTICE 633-34 (1975).
15. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 125 (1977).
16. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. See, e.g., Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
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"noninterpretive" accounts. 9 Interpretive accounts usually claim that, properly
understood, the intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment framers support the
holding in Brown. By contrast, noninterpretive accounts argue that some extra-
textual source of legal meaning dictates the same result. To elucidate, I will
examine two paradigmatic examples of the respective genres.
Robert Bork is famous for insisting that "the original understanding" of a
constitutional provision's meaning provides the only legitimate basis for
constitutional interpretation. 20 Regarding Brown, Bork freely admits that the
authors of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the segregation of public
schools was fully consistent with what they meant by "equal protection of the
laws.",2' That admission would seem to require the conclusion that Brown was
wrongly decided. Of course, Bork denies this.22 The Equal Protection Clause,23
he argues, was intended to achieve black equality.24 The framers merely
assumed that this intention was consistent with state-mandated segregation.
Subsequent history proved them wrong:
By 1954 ... it had been apparent for some time that segregation rarely if
ever produced equality. Quite aside from any question of psychology, the
physical facilities provided for blacks were not as good as those provided for
whites. That had been demonstrated in a long series of cases .... [yet]
endless litigation, aside from the burden on the courts, also would never
produce the equality the Constitution promised. The Court's realistic choice,
therefore, was either to abandon the quest for equality by allowing
segregation or to forbid segregation in order to achieve equality. There was
no third choice. Either choice would violate one aspect of the original
understanding, but there was no possibility of avoiding that. Since equality
and segregation were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not
understand that, both could not be honored. When that is seen, it is obvious
that the Court must choose equality and prohibit state-imposed segregation.
The purpose that brought the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment into being was
equality before the law, and equality, not separation, was written into the
text.25
This account begs a number of important questions. For instance, itI
assumes without argument that the ratifiers' concept of equality was a coherent
one. Leaving such considerations aside, Bork's account nevertheless illustrates
19. Thomas Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975).
20. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 82 (1990).
21. Id. at 82.
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. See Bork, supra note 20, at 82.
25. See Bork, supra note 20, at 82.
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the insuperable difficulties faced by any mildly interventionist theory of judicial
review that depends on the interpretation of the constitutional text-that is, on
a historical inquiry into the intention of the text's authors. As in Bork's
example, such an inquiry will, by its nature, operate almost exclusively in the
realm of a radically counterfactual hypothesis. This might be called the "if
John Bingham had foreseen the civil rights movement" syndrome. The
interpreter is reduced to asking hypothetical questions completely alien to the
authors' actual historical situation, which in turn leads almost inevitably to the
assumption that the authors would have answered them just as the interpreter
would like them answered. In fact, we simply have no way of knowing what
the authors of the Equal Protection Clause26 would have done had they
understood that their simultaneous belief in equality under the law and their
approval of legal segregation would lead to what law professors a century later
would treat as an interpretive contradiction.
All interpretivist theories of judicial review face this problem, and most
deal with it as Bork does: by abstracting the idea of the author's intent to a high
enough level of generality. If one talks about the "purpose" of a provision in
sufficient generalities-if, for instance, we assume that the purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause27 was to produce the results required by the essentially empty
idea of "equality" 28-then almost any result can be reconciled with the putative
intentions of the text's authors. This trivializes the concept of interpretation by
making the constitutional text utterly plastic for all practical, that is, litigable,
purposes. Indeed, eminent legal scholars have produced "originalist"
interpretations of the Constitution that have supported or condemned practically
every major decision of the modem Supreme Court, including-or perhaps more
accurately, beginning with-Brown itself.
When Robert Bork was nominated to the Supreme Court, his nomination
was opposed by no more vocal or distinguished critic than Ronald Dworkin.
Indeed, Dworkin went so far as to declare Bork "a constitutional radical"
because "he rejects the view that the Supreme Court must test its interpretations
of the Constitution against the principles latent in its own past decisions as well
as other aspects of the nation's constitutional history. He regards central parts
of settled constitutional doctrine as mistakes now open to repeal ....
Dworkin summed up the jurisprudence of the former Alexander Bickel
Professor of Law at Yale Law School by announcing that Bork's constitutional
philosophy was "not just impoverished and unattractive but no philosophy at
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
27. Id.
28. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982).
29. Ronald Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, NEw YORK REvIEW OF Booxs, Aug. 13, 1987, at 3.
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all. '30  One would expect, then, that Dworkin's views on constitutional
interpretation would have little or nothing in common with those of his
antagonist. In fact, despite superficial differences, their interpretative theories
are practically indistinguishable from each other.3'
This statement may seem surprising in light of Dworkin's rejection of what
he calls the "speaker's meaning" view of interpretation.32 Supporters of this
view take what Dworkin considers the hopelessly naive position that the point
of trying to determine what someone said is to figure out what they meant.33
Dworkin, by contrast, suggests that in legal hermeneutics "interpretation"
consists of making the text "the best it can be. 34 That is, the interpreter should
treat legal texts in general, and the Constitution in particular, as if they were the
work of a single author, and then "interpret" them to make in particular this
fictional author's text reflect the meaning most compatible with the best
available political and ethical theory.35
Now, it might seem that no view could be further removed from the
jurisprudence of "the original understanding." Yet both Dworkin and Bork rely
on fictionalizing the historical situation to operate on the putative object of
interpretation at an extremely high level of theoretical abstraction. Both insist
that they are interpreting the Constitution's text; nevertheless, neither man is
much interested in that text's meaning-that is, in the extremely complex and in
many ways irrecoverable historical fact of what the text's authors actually said.
This is no accident: There can be little doubt that, whatever the Constitution's
authors meant to say, that meaning will prove inadequate to any plausible
descriptive or normative account of judicial review. Bork and Dworkin are, of
course, aware of this. Hence Bork's abstraction of constitutional intent to the
most manipulable level of generality, rather than accepting that intent as a set
of specific historical facts, however disturbing; hence Dworkin's transformation
of the constitutional text into the best it can be, rather than attempting to
understand that text for what it actually is. All positive theories of judicial
review depend on some variation of these functionally identical moves.
I suggest that the paradigmatic work of two such distinguished yet bitterly
conflicting intellectuals tells us that constitutional theory is an impossible
enterprise. Any theory that claims to reconcile the ordinary products of
30. Id. at 10.
31. For a devastating critique of the intellectual hubris that linked Bork and his most celebrated
opponents, see Robert F. Nagel, Meeting the Enemy, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 633 (1990).
32. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 348.
33. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 315-17.
34. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 348.
35. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 348-50.
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constitutional jurisprudence with an interpretation of the Constitution's text will
require from the theorist nothing less than a mortification of the intellect. Why
then do so many of our most talented scholars continue to devote themselves to
what a psychologist might define as a neurotic vocation?
"Human kind," the poet T.S. Eliot once said, "cannot bear very much
reality., 36 We demand of our Constitution both that it never change, and that
it reflect the morality of the present moment; that it be law-which is to say the
product of fallible persons-and infallible secular scripture; that it be our own
creation, and yet remain somehow fundamentally better than we are or, in truth,
have ever been. It is, perhaps, the proper role of judges to fulfill these needs.
They must then take on the political and ethical burden of continually rewriting
history, while always calling those revisions "what the Constitution requires."
Their opinions legitimate this activity by obscuring its nature; and while those
texts are defensible as political acts, they cannot be defended as interpretations
of the Constitution's text.
Normative constitutional theory is in essence a series of academic
legitimations of those judicial legitimations. It is a kind of intellectual
cheerleading for what must be by its nature an anti-intellectual practice. I once
wrote that one of the greatest difficulties facing a legal academic who argues
for the basic truth that an interpretation of a text is always an attempt to
determine what the text's author meant is that someone immediately asks "what
about Brown v. Board of Education?'37 Well, what about Brown v. Board of
Education? Isn't it a little late in the day to be asking this question? Do
geologists, after all, gather together at conferences in order to discuss the
normative implications of continental drift? Do they spend much time debating
the desirability of that particular process, or discussing ways in which it might
be reversed? I recommend that in the future we consider not talking about the
legitimacy of Brown decision, if for no other reason than that it would keep
people like me from talking about not talking about the legitimacy of Brown
decision. And surely that, we can all agree, would be a good thing.
36. T.S. ELIOT, Four Quartets, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS, 1909-1950, at 117-18 (1971)
("[Hiuman kind/Cannot bear very much reality.").
37. Campos, Three Mistakes About Interpretation, supra note 2, at 397.
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